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T. Komarova, D. Nekipelov, A. Al Rafi, E. Yakovlev1 
K-anonymity: A note on the trade-off between data utility and data security 
 
Researchers often use data from multiple datasets to conduct credible econometric and statistical 
analysis. The most reliable way to link entries across such datasets is to exploit unique identifiers if those 
are available. Such linkage however may result in privacy violations revealing sensitive information about 
some individuals in a sample. Thus, a data curator with concerns for individual privacy may choose to 
remove certain individual information from the private dataset they plan on releasing to researchers. The 
extent of individual information the data curator keeps in the private dataset can still allow a researcher to 
link the datasets, most likely with some errors, and usually results in a researcher having several feasible 
combined datasets. One conceptual framework a data curator may rely on is k-anonymity, 2k ³ , which 
gained wide popularity in computer science and statistical community. To ensure k-anonymity, the data 
curator releases only the amount of identifying information in the private dataset that guarantees that eve-
ry entry in it can be linked to at least k  different entries in the publicly available datasets the researcher 
will use. In this paper, we look at the data combination task and the estimation task from both perspec-
tives – from the perspective of the researcher estimating the model and from the perspective of a data cu-
rator who restricts identifying information in the private dataset to make sure that k-anonymity holds. We 
illustrate how to construct identifiers in practice and use them to combine some entries across two da-
tasets. We also provide an empirical illustration on how a data curator can ensure k-anonymity and conse-
quences it has on the estimation procedure. Naturally, the utility of the combined data gets smaller as k  
increases, which is also evident from our empirical illustration.  
Keywords: data protection; data combination; k-anonymity. 
JEL classification: C35; C14; C25; C13. 
 
1. Introduction 
Data needed to carry out empirical analyses are often stored in separate databases. Thus, accurate-
ly combining the observations in these disjoint databases often constitutes a first essential step in such 
analysis. For large and well-indexed databases, constructing a combined dataset often amounts to finding 
or constructing unique identifiers for the disjoint databases and selecting the unique matching pairs of 
observations based on these identifiers. Once a combined dataset of these unique matches has been con-
structed, these data can be used to estimate the requisite statistical model. However, as highlighted in the 
work by Komarova et al. (2015), the resulting estimated statistical model, and perhaps even policies based 
on the model, will reflect the characteristics of the individuals whose information was used to construct 
the combined dataset. Though the researcher may not release the combined dataset in its entirety, releas-
ing the estimates along with the combination procedure used is common practice in the world of research 
This enhanced information about the distribution of characteristics (as offered by published point 
                                                
1  Komarova Tatiana — London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK;  t.komarova@lse.ac.uk. 
    Nekipelov Denis — University of Virginia, Charlottesville, US;  denis@virginia.edu. 
    Al Rafi Ahnaf — London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK;  A.A.Rafi@lse.ac.uk. 
    Yakovlev Evgeny — New Economic School, Moscow, Russia;  eyakovlev@nes.ru. 
2 
 
estimates and data combination method) can present a threat to the security of the individuals’ infor-
mation, especially when one of the databases contains sensitive individual data. As shown by Komarova 
et al. (2015), among others, this threat can be posed even when each database itself poses no risk — be-
cause the sensitive data may be name-address anonymized and the other publicly available data may con-
tain names and addresses along with other information about individual characteristics. For instance, the 
database containing sensitive information could be a name-address anonymized registry of individuals 
who have undergone or are currently undergoing psychiatric treatment at in-patient units, whilst another 
database could be a publicly available tax database containing names and addresses, along with infor-
mation about other characteristics like taxable income, etc. A combined dataset will be able to assign 
names and addresses to the patients, and this will result in a security breach. 
With such threats to security being made possible by the public release of estimates and combina-
tion method, those left in charge of handling the security of information present in the «sensitive data-
bases» (who we shall call the data curators) may wish to impose further security measures before releas-
ing the data to the researcher. For instance, they may require the researcher to sign an agreement which 
imposes an anonymity restriction on the researcher’s available combination methods. It may also be the 
case that the researcher and the data curator are the same entity — as is the case with some experimental 
drug treatment RCT’s in the medical field. 
The goal of this paper is to consider the problem of estimating a linear regression model with se-
lection problems (see Section 2) when the data is contained in separate databases, and the researcher 
(henceforth the econometrician) has a restriction placed on her research by the data curator regarding the 
anonymity of the individuals in the dataset. We present a simple procedure called «implementing k-
anonymity» (Definition 2), where kÎN , which the researcher can follow to ensure that she meets the 
anonymity requirements given to her by the curator. We also show that following this procedure comes at 
the cost of point estimation, and that empirical analysis following the implementation of k-anonymity for 
2k ³  can result in sets of parameter estimates instead of unique estimates. To do this, we consider an 
empirical example involving restaurants in the Durham, NC area and the ratings and reviews they receive 
on Yelp — a website which allows its users to rate and review listed businesses. We estimate a regression 
model of ratings (the utility individuals derived from dining at a given restaurant) on individual and res-
taurant characteristics. Yelp does not publish information on the users providing the ratings and we used 
the public personal and real estate property tax database to collect demographic data regarding potential 
Yelp users. Our data collection and summary statistics are presented in Section 3. The main objective of 
this paper is to illustrate how data combination can be conducted in practice when data come from differ-
ent datasets and to illustrate the implementation of k-anonymity. With that purpose in mind, we treat the 
Yelp dataset as the sensitive or restricted dataset (we think of ranking data as sensitive data) and the prop-
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erty tax dataset as our publicly available, non-sensitive dataset. We first estimate the model presented in 
Section 2.4 based on unique matches in the two datasets to get point estimates of the utility parameters of 
interest. These point estimates are presented in Table 5 in Section 4. Then we estimate the model again 
after implementing 2-anonymity and 3-anonymity on our combination procedure. These estimates are 
presented in Section 5. Section 2 can be broken down as follows. 
Section 2.1 describes the assumed structure of the data we are using from a population perspec-
tive. We introduce the notion of an infeasible «master dataset» – a hypothetical combined dataset availa-
ble from the two separate disjoint datasets consisting of all correct unique matches. Section 2.2 presents 
the problem we face in constructing identifiers for linking Yelp users with their corresponding entries in 
the property tax database. Section 2.3 outlines the choice problem faced by the econometrician selecting 
combination methods. We also discuss the anonymity restrictions placed on the econometrician’s research 
in this subsection and the consequences these restrictions pose for combining data. Section 2.4 discusses 
the utility model we would like to estimate and its associated identification problem. We conclude our 
discussion in Section 6. 
 
2. Model setup 
We consider the problem of estimating a linearly parametrized utility function with selection 
problems (in the decision to engage in the utility-producing activity as well as in the decision to reveal the 
utility derived) when the data is contained in two separate datasets — one «private» and one «public». To 
do this, we follow a setup similar to (Komarova et al., 2015, 2017). However, we make a slight adjust-
ment to the data generating model due to the fact that each observation in our hypothetical «master da-
taset» is not just a single individual, but an individual-firm combination. 
 
2.1. Data structure: The «master» sample 
A firm in our sample is described by a real-valued random vector X  and a string-valued random 
vector fW . The realisations of X  belong to 
k fÍX R  and the realisations of fW  belong to a finite set of 
strings we denote by fW . 
Each individual’s decision-utility responses for a given restaurant are described by a random vec-
tor ( )0 1= , ,Y U d d ¢ , which takes values in { }
2= 0,1´Y U , where ÍU R . Each individual is described by 
a random vector ( )= ,M AX X X  which takes values in = M A´X X X , where MX  takes values in 
kM
M ÍX R  and 
AX  takes values in kAA ÍX R . The sample realisations of 
MX  come from our private 
dataset, henceforth referred to as the main dataset, and the sample realisations of AX  come from our pub-
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lic dataset, henceforth referred to as the auxiliary dataset. 
Each individual is also labeled by vectors V  and W  containing combinations real and string val-
ued variables that identify the individual, but do not interfere with the individual’s utility-decision re-
sponses (e.g. names, date of birth, etc.). We assume that V  and W  serve simply as labels and do not con-
tain any utility-relevant information. This is later incorporated more formally in Assumption 1. The reali-
sations of V  belong to the product space = kvM ´V S R  and the sample realisations of V  are contained in 
our main dataset. Similarly, the realisations of W  belong to the product space = kwA ´W S R  and the 
sample realisations of W  are contained in the auxiliary dataset. We note that it is possible for some string 
valued variables to interfere with individual responses. For instance, one’s address or the address of the 
restaurant could affect the decision to attend a certain restaurant due to the distance and associated cost of 
travel (though it may be unlikely to affect the rating given). However, we deal with this by noting that 
addresses can be well summarized by a numerical variable like zip-code (or if one wants to be extremely 
precise, some coordinate system). We assume that the addresses (and any other string variable that may 
affect responses) have corresponding numerical equivalents (procured in the same dataset) which account 
for these effects, and are the only channel through which responses are affected. As in (Komarova et al., 
2015), we note that each string can be converted into the digital binary format, and that there are numer-
ous examples of definitions of distances over strings (e.g. see (Wilson et al., 2006)). We can define the 
norm in MS  as the distance between a given point and a «generic» point corresponding to the most com-
monly observed set of attributes. Then, the norm in V  is defined as a weighted combination of the norm 
in MS  and the Euclidean norm in 
kwR . All of the above arguments can of course be replicated for W . 
We assume that the data generating process creates f AN N×  i.i.d. draws from the joint distribu-
tion of the random vector ( ), , , , , fY X V W WX . fN  is the number of firms and AN  is the number of in-
dividuals. These draws form the infeasible «master» sample:  
( ){ }, , , , , =1, , , =1, ,fip i i i p p A fy x v w w i N p Nx . 
 
2.2. Data structure: The linkage problem for users and taxpayers 
We are however faced with the following problem: the observations for the covariates pertaining 
to individual characteristics are not contained in the same sample. Assume that no such restrictions are 
present for the firms. So we restrict our attention to dealing with the separated-data problem for individu-
als until Assumption 1, where we have to refer to the joint distribution of the responses, individual char-
acteristics, individual identifiers and restaurant characteristics. 
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One sample containing AN  observations is the «public data» i.i.d. sample ( ){ } =1,
NAA
j j j
x w , which as 
previously stated, we will refer to as the auxiliary dataset. To keep notation concise during conditioning, 
we will denote this dataset by ADS . The second dataset is a subset of AN N£  observations from the 
«master dataset» and contains information regarding the other individual-specific covariates ( ){ }
=1
,
NM
i i i
x v . 
As previously stated, we will refer to this dataset as the main dataset, and to keep notation concise during 
conditioning, we will denote this dataset by MDS . Following Komarova, Nekipelov, and Yakovlev 
(2015), we consider the case where there is no direct link between the main and auxiliary datasets, i.e. iv  
and jw  do not provide immediate links between the two datasets. For instance, in our example, out of 
4295 possible links between individuals in the main (Yelp) and auxiliary (Property Tax) datasets given by 
our linkage procedure, only 66 unique links were identifiable, without the imposition of any anonymizing 
restrictions. 
Thus, before engaging in any identification or estimation exercises, the econometrician first needs 
to construct a linkage procedure that will correctly combine the two datasets with high probability. We 
will also assume that the econometrician has been instructed by those in charge of curating the data she is 
working with to impose restrictions on the linkage and estimation procedures she uses to protect the ano-
nymity of the individuals involved. The reasons for this are understandably numerous (as the discussion 
in Section 1 above should indicate) in the case of sensitive data in the «private» dataset. As stated, the 
anonymizing procedure we examine in this paper is called «k-anonymity» which is defined in Definition 
2 given below. 
We first consider a two-step procedure that uses the similarity of information contained in the 
identifiers and covariates to provide links between the two datasets. The parameter of interest is then es-
timated from the links established by our procedure. To establish said similarity, we assume that the 
econometrician constructs variables ( )= ,M M MZ Z X V  and ( )= ,A A AZ Z X W  which act as individual 
identifiers and take values in a common space = kz´Z S R . The space S  is a finite set of non-numeric 
nature corresponding to the information contained in MS  and AS . Assume that S  is a space of strings 
endowed with a metric ( ),d × ×S  from the set of commonly used string distances. The distance in Z  is then 
defined as the weighted combination of dS  and the Euclidean metric in 
kzR : 
( ) ( )( )1 222, = ,M A M A M AS S S z z zd z z d z z z zw w+ -Z S  where ( )= ,p p pS zZ Z Z , for { },p M AÎ  and , > 0S zw w . 
We also define the «null» element of S  as the observed set of attributes that has the most number of 
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components with the other observed sets of attributes and denote this by 0S . Then the norm in Z  is de-
fined as the distance from the null element: ( )( )1 22 2= ,0S S z zz d z zw w+S SZ . 
When the set Z  is sufficiently large or contains some potentially «difficult to replicate» infor-
mation (e.g. full name, social security number, or a combination of both, etc.), then a match in the two 
datasets based on this infrequent information very likely singles out the data of one person. This is for-
malized by expecting that if the identifiers take infrequent values (modelled as the case identifiers having 
large norms), then the fact that the values of MZ  and AZ  are close implies that the two corresponding 
observations belong to the same individual with high probability. This probability is a decreasing function 
with respect to the frequency of the observed values of MZ  and AZ . We maintain the following assump-
tions regarding the distribution of the random vector ( ), , , , ,M M A AY X Z X Z X :  
Assumption 1.  There exists a  such that for any ( )0,a aÎ : 
1.  Proximity of identifiers:  
 ( )( ), < = , = , >1 1M A M M A A Ad Z Z X x X x Za a a³ -P Z Z . 
2.  Non-zero probability of extreme values in both datasets:  
 ( )>1 = > 0M M MZ X xaP Z ,  
 ( )>1 = > 0A A AZ X xaP Z . 
3.  Redundancy of identifiers in the combined data: There exists a sufficiently large > 0K  such that for 
all Mz K³
Z
 and all Az K³
Z
  
( ) ( )= , = , = , = , = = = , = , =M M A A M M A A M M A Af Y X x X x Z z Z z f Y X x X xx xX X , 
where f  is the joint density of ( ), , , , ,M M A AY X Z X Z X  and each ( )f × ×  above pertains to the respective 
conditional densities.  
Assumption 1.1 embodies the idea that more reliable matches are provided by pairs of identifiers 
whose values are infrequent. For instance, in our example, if we found an observation in the Yelp dataset 
for Durham, NC with the attribute «Aaditya C» and an observation in the Durham, NC Property Tax da-
taset with the attribute «Aaditya Chakraborty»2, we might expect them to belong to the same individual 
with a higher probability than if we found attribute values «Jane D» in the Yelp dataset and «Jane Doe» in 
                                                
2 This name does not belong to anyone known to the authors. It was generated by one co-author’s knowledge of long 
Bengali first names and surnames that would be unlikely to observed exceedingly frequently in Durham, NC. 
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the Property Tax dataset. We stress here that infrequency of a particular identifier does not mean that the 
corresponding observation is an «outlier». If the two datasets contain very detailed individual information 
such as combinations of full name, address and social security number, most attribute values will be 
unique. 
Assumption 1.2 requires that there are sufficiently many observations with infrequent attribute 
values. This can be established empirically in each of the observed datasets making this a testable as-
sumption. 
Assumption 1.3 is crucial for the purpose of identification. It implies that even for extreme values 
of the identifiers (i.e. for observations that fall below a prescribed level of frequency) and the associated 
observed covariates (for individuals as well as firms), the identifiers only serve the purpose of data labels 
as soon as the «master dataset» (or the feasible subsample of the «master dataset») is recovered. 
We note that in our empirical example, prior to imposing our anonymity restrictions, we have to 
restrict our name-based identifier to the surname initial since this is what is available for each Yelp user 
— the entire surname of the individual is not revealed. Our identifiers also do not have a numerical com-
ponent, since no numerical identifiers (e.g. zip codes, telephone numbers, social security numbers) are 
available in the Yelp dataset. Thus our identifier norm is based solely on the frequency of the strings ob-
served as can be seen in the matching distribution given in Section 4, Table 2. The exposition above out-
lines more general constructions for the identifiers used in linking the two datasets. 
 
2.3. Combining the data — decision rules and k-anonymity 
Using the identifiers presented in Section 2.2, we describe the data combination procedure used 
by the econometrician in finite samples by means of a deterministic binary decision rule 
{ }: 0,1N ´ ®D Z Z , where N ÎN  is the size of the main dataset MDS  and for each pair of observations 
i  in the main dataset MDS  and j  in auxiliary dataset ADS ,  
( ) 1, if and satisfy certain conditions,, =
0, otherwise.
M A
M A i j
N i j
z z
z z
ì
í
î
D  
Thus, for each pair of observations i  in MDS  and j  in ADS , we have an indicator variable ijM  
defined by ( )= ,M Aij N i jM z zD  which labels the pair as a «match» ( )=1ijM  if we think that the observa-
tions belong to the same individual or labels the pair as a «non-match» ( )= 0ijM  if we think that it is un-
likely that the observations belong to the same individual or are simply uncertain about this. 
We focus on the set of data combination rules that is generated by our Assumption 1.1. For ex-
ample, for the prescribed a , we consider the data combination rule:  
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 ( ) ( ){ }, = , < , >1M A M A AN i j i j N j Nz z d z z za a1 Z ZD                                            (1) 
generated by a Cauchy sequence ( )N Na ÎN  such that 0 < <Na a  for all N ÎN  and lim 0N Na®¥ = . The 
sequence ( )N Na ÎN  gives a sequence of thresholds that impose more stringent «rare» identifier frequency 
and distance requirements on larger samples, and tries to isolate unique matches in the limit (identifier 
distance of zero). For a more thorough discussion of more general conditions that can be imposed on this 
sequence, the interested reader is encouraged to read (Komarova et al., 2015, 2017). 
Once the decision rule for combining the two samples in question has been chosen, the econome-
trician also needs to consider the efficacy with which the chosen rule makes links between individuals and 
take into account the anonymity restrictions placed on her by the data curator. To do this, the following 
theoretical indicator is used:  
Definition 1. Let ijm  be the indicator of the event that i  and j  are actually the same individual, 
where i  is an individual in the main dataset MDS  and  j  is an individual in the auxiliary dataset ADS . 
Thus ijm  is equal to 1 if and only if i  and j  correspond to the same individual in our infeasible «master 
dataset».  
Thus, ijm  is the «true match» indicator for any pair ,i j . Since the «master dataset» is infeasible, 
it is impossible to actually observe ijm . Given this infeasibility, we can expect the decision rule to indi-
cate incorrect matches (under the true match ijm ) as being «possibly or likely correct» with positive prob-
ability. So, since we can make incorrect matches, the match indicator ijM  under the decision rule ND  is 
not necessarily equal to ijm . The econometrician would however want ijM  and ijm  to be highly correlat-
ed given the data available and subject to any anonymity restrictions given to her by a data curator (in-
cluding of course the case of no restrictions). We may assume that the econometrician has an objective 
function that depends on the choice of decision rule, the available data and ijm  which she wants to max-
imize subject to the restrictions. For instance, she may wish to maximize 
( )Corr , , = 1, ,' M Aij ij N i j M AM m z zé ùë ûD DS DS . This particular choice problem over decision rules is equiva-
lent to solving3:  
                                                
3 For the interested reader who may be wondering how we derived the above optimisation problem involving a con-
ditional probability from a statement about conditional correlation, notice that ijM , ijm  and ij ijM m  are all indicator 
random variables. The conditional expectation and variance of each indicator are both equal to the conditional prob-
ability of the indicator taking the value 1. Also note that the conditional probability of ijm  taking the value 1 given 
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( )( )argmax =1 , =1, ,
subject to satisfying the requisite anonymity restrictions.
' M A
N ij N i j M A
'
N
'
N
m z zÎ
D
D D DS DS
D
P
                         (2) 
The choice of a decision rule is a separate complex problem that deserves a detailed discussion in 
a different paper. We would not be able to do it justice in this paper. So here we just assume that the 
econometrician solves her particular problem and chooses an appropriate decision rule ND . She then con-
structs a combined dataset as follows:   
1. If observation i  in MDS  is included in the combined dataset, then  ( )=1 , 1A
N M A
N i jj
z z ³å D .  
2. For each i  satisfying ( )=1 , 1A
N M A
N i jj
z z ³å D , we pick an observation j  in ADS  such that 
( ), = 1M AN i jz zD  and add the combined vector ( ), , ,M M A Ai i j jx z x z  to the combined dataset if 
neither ( ),M Mi ix z  for this specific i  nor ( ),A Aj jx z  for this specific j  enters the combined da-
taset as subvectors of other combined observation vectors in the combined dataset.  
This process can of course result in several possible combined datasets due to the possibility of 
incorrect matches. We denote this collection of datasets resulting from the chosen decision rule ND  and 
the available data ( ),M ADS DS  by ( ), ,N M AG D DS DS . We also assume that this is a non-empty set for 
the chosen decision rule. Once the model to be estimated is identified, the econometrician runs the associ-
ated estimation procedure using a subset of the datasets in ( ), ,N M AG D DS DS . This subset can be the en-
tire set, or some randomly selected subset. Thus, once anonymity restrictions are satisfied, the estimates 
the econometrician can release become sets of point estimates instead of a single point estimate. Estima-
tion from an arbitrarily chosen dataset in ( ), ,N M AG D DS DS  can be subject to error stemming from mis-
match and so, this particular course of action would be inadvisable. 
We move on to describing a particular class (indexed by the half-open unit interval (0,1] ) of ano-
nymity restrictions that may be placed on the econometrician by the data curator based on disclosure risk. 
Suppose the econometrician is considering the decision rule choice problem and the data curator knows 
prior to the choice being made that the choice and its associated «combined dataset formation» process 
will be released to the public alongside the parameter estimates as part of the research documentation (as 
is standard or usual research practice). The sensitive data used however will not be released (as per the 
contract with the curator). The curator is concerned about the risk of individual disclosure. An individual 
disclosure occurs when an individual in the «master dataset» (available to the curator) is correctly 
                                                                                                                                                       
the data available is fixed by definition of ijm  since it is independent to any identifiers used. 
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matched in the two datasets by ND  — which is the event that =1ijm  given that ( ), = 1M AN i jz zD  and giv-
en the available data ,M ADS DS . For technical convenience, we assume that the curator is concerned with 
placing an upper bound on the conditional probability of the above event for any pair of observations in 
the respective datasets. That is, she is concerned with making sure that 
( )( )=1 , = 1, ,M Aij N i j M Am z z d£D DS DSP   for all observations i  in MDS  and all observations j  in 
ADS , where (0,1]d Î . For a full discussion of other measures of disclosure risk as well as measures of 
harm from disclosure, we refer the interested reader to (Komarova et al., 2017) and (Lambert, 1993). No-
tice that in the above set of anonymity restrictions, the case of the curator imposing =1d  is equivalent to 
the curator not imposing any restrictions at all. 
We now describe a set of anonymisation procedures (indexed by kÎN ) that a data curator may 
use. The econometrician then calibrates the estimator to the choice of the anonymisation procedure used 
by the data curator. This procedure is called «implementing k-anonymity». It became widely accepted in 
the computer science and data science community. Its description can be found e.g. in (Samarati, 
Sweeney, 1998; Sweeney, 2002a, 2002b). In our context it is defined as follows:  
Definition 2 (k-anonymity).   Let kÎN  be given. We say that the binary decision rule ( ),N × ×D  
implements k-anonymity if for each observation i  in the main dataset MDS  ( )=1, ,i N , one of the fol-
lowing (mutually exclusive) conditions hold:   
1)  ( ), = 0M AN i jz zD  for all =1, , Aj N ; that is, i  cannot be combined with any observation j  
in the auxiliary dataset ADS ;  
2)  ( )=1 ,A
N M A
N i jj
z z k³å D ; that is, for i  there are at least k  equally good matches in the auxiliary 
dataset.  
 
Remark 1.  Note that by implementing k-anonymity, we have that for any i  from MDS  and any 
j  from ADS ,  
( )( )
( )
( )
=1
=1
0, if , = 0,
= 1 , =1, , =
1 , , otherwise.
A
A
N
M A
N i l
lM A
ij N i j M A N
M A
N i j
j
z z
m z z
z z
ì
ï
ï
í
ï
ïî
å
å
P
D
D DS DS
D
 
 So, it always holds that  
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( )( ) 1=1 , = 1, ,M Aij N i j M Am z z k£D DS DSP . 
 
The data curator first chooses a kÎN  that would allow her to satisfy the upper bound on indi-
vidual disclosure risk, d , that yields the desired bound for the disclosure risk. For the given (0,1]d Î , the 
set of «correct» choices of k  is non-empty, since { }1m m dÎ ³ ¹ÆN  (which follows since R  has the 
Archimedean Property) and by Remark 1, we can choose any k  in this set. Once this choice has been 
made, the econometrician restricts herself to the set of decision rules that account for the fact that the data 
curator used k-anonymity with a given k .4 
It is also worth noting that a choice rule ND  corresponding a higher k  (as long as Ak N£ ) leads 
to a larger set of possible combined datasets ( ), ,N M AG D DS DS . This follows from our observation that 
each k  corresponds to an upper bound on disclosure risk of 1 k . A more stringent restriction resulting 
from a choice of a higher k  leads to each observation in the main dataset being matched under the asso-
ciated rule ND  to more individuals in the auxiliary dataset. This results in more possible combined da-
tasets if the combined dataset construction process above is followed. 
We conclude this section by noting that the choice of decision rule can be controlled by restrict-
ing the identifiers used for the purpose of combination. This can be achieved for instance by adjusting the 
string norm by making the set of «frequently observed» characteristics larger. One could also achieve this 
by changing the set Z  of values the identifier takes — making it smaller would make it more difficult to 
find «rare» observations to construct unique matches with. We combine these approaches when imple-
menting 2-anonymity and 3-anonymity in our empirical example in Section 5. 
2.4. Individual restaurant rankings 
2.4.1. Attendance and review decision process 
We consider the model of individual restaurant rankings. The utility that an individual extracts 
from dining in at a restaurant depends on a vector of demographic characteristics of the individual (such 
as wealth, location, and ethnicity), x , and a vector of restaurant-specific characteristics, x . This utility 
also depends an individual-specific idiosyncratic component h  on a restaurant-specific idiosyncratic 
                                                
4 We note here that we have thus far left open the possibility of the curator imposing an anonymity restriction that is 
too stringent for the available data. For instance it is possible that 1 > ANd
- , which would require each observation 
in MDS  to be linked by ND  to more observations in ADS  than it actually contains or none at all! We may therefore 
assume that the curator is reasonable, and imposes a d  which at least satisfies 1 ANd ³ . One would of course usu-
ally prefer a d  that is much more lax to get more value from the available data, but still offers sufficient protection 
against individual disclosure to keep the curator satisfied. 
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component e , which is not observed by the econometrician. The full ex post utility of the individual is 
defined as:  
( )= ,U u x ex h- -  
where we assume that it is separable in a deterministic component ( , )u × ×  and the stochastic component 
eh + . 
The individual decision problem is as follows. First, the individual makes a decision to go to a 
restaurant based on his or her expectation of the restaurant quality:  
( ) [ ]{ }0 = , 0d u x e1 x h- - ³E . 
We assume that consumers can correctly evaluate the uncertainty regarding the restaurant quality. Se-
cond, after making the decision to dine at the restaurant, the individual decides to write a review rating the 
restaurant if the ex post utility from visiting the restaurant exceeds a certain threshold:  
( ){ }1 = ,d u x e u1 x h- - ³ . 
In other words, we expect the individual to write a review if he or she was either very happy or very un-
happy with the dining experience. Finally, the restaurant rating will be positive if the individual was 
pleased with the dining experience:  
( ){ }2 = ,d u x e u1 x h- - ³ . 
 
2.4.2. Identification 
In the data we observe the decision to write a favourable review along with the restaurant data 
( )2= ,y d x  for all people who wrote a review and we can observe the individual characteristics x . 
It is clear that without the additional demographic information, we would not be able to correctly 
estimate the parameters of the decision problem only based on the restaurant rating data. In fact, we only 
observe the data for individuals who came to the restaurant and wrote a review. This is the main source 
of «activity bias» (similar to selection bias) in this environment. 
Now we map the structural elements of the model (the individual’s deterministic utility compo-
nent) to the observable variables. Assume that utility shocks h  and e  are mutually independent and that 
they are also independent from the observable characteristics of consumers and restaurants. We also nor-
malize the distributions of unobserved shocks assuming that ( )0,1e : N  and ( )20,:h sN . Then, the 
probability of the decision to write a positive review, given that the individual writes a review and given 
the individual-specific unobserved shock can be written as:  
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( ) ( )( )
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0
2 1 0
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x h x h
x h
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£ - -
=
- - ³
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P
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( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
,
=
, ,
u x u
u x u u x u
x h
x h x h
F - -
F - - +F - - +
, 
where ( )F ×  is the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. Finally, recalling that we normalized the res-
taurant-specific shock, we necessarily have [ ] = 0eE . This means that we can determine the density of 
the distribution of individual-specific utility shocks for an individual who chooses to dine at the restau-
rant:  
( )
( )
( )( ) ( )0
, if , ,
,=1, , =
0, otherwise,
u x
u xf d x
j h s
h x
s xh x
ì
£ï Fí
ï
î
 
where ( )j ×  is the standard normal density. As a result, we are able to express the observable probability 
of a favourable review by taking the expectation over the utility shocks for consumers who choose to dine 
in the restaurant:  
( )2 1 0=1 = =1, ,d d d x xP = 
 ( )( )( )
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1
,
,
= ,
, ,
u x
u x u
u x d
u x u u x u
x
x h j h s
s x h
x h x h
-
-¥
F - -
F
F - - +F - - +ò . 
We can establish non-parametric identification of deterministic component of individual utility given the 
specified assumptions on unobservable variables and the individual decision. 
 
Theorem 1. Suppose that there exist x*  and x * , and x**  and x**  in the support of the random 
variables X  and X  such that ( ), = 0u x x* *  and ( ), = 1u x x** ** . Then if there is a subset of the support of 
X  and X  where the observable probability ( )2 1 0=1 = =1, ,d d d x xP  has non-zero matrix of first de-
rivatives (or first differences for discrete covariates) with respect to x  and x , then structural parame-
ters of the model { }( , ), ,u u s× ×  are identified.  
Proof. Consider the observed positive rating probability at points ( ),x x* * , and ( ),x x** ** . We 
note that  
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
2 1 0
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1 1 1
u s s
d d d x d
u s u s
s j
x h
s s
** **
-¥
F - -
F F - - +F - - +òP . 
Note that for any > 0s  and > 0u , the gradients of the right-hand side of both equations are not equal to 
zero. Moreover, both right-hand sides are monotone increasing in s  and monotone decreasing in u  tak-
ing values from 0 to 1. By the intermediate value theorem for continuous functions, the constructed sys-
tem of equations has a solution. Moreover, due to strict monotonicity, this solution is unique. 
Finally, given s  and u , we can see that the right-hand side depends on the function ( , )u x x . We 
can differentiate the right-hand side with respect to ( , )u × ×  as the argument. Then we note that the gradient 
of the observed probability with respect to the unknown utility at the point ( , )x x* *  can be expressed as  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
0
21 2
u s s
s ds
u s u s
s j
k
p s s
*
-¥
F - -
- +
F - - +F - +òP , 
where ( )2 1 0= =1 = =1, ,d d d xP x* * *P  and ( ) > 0sk . This expression is strictly positive. Therefore, 
integration of the observed probability from ( ), = 0u x x* *  to -¥  allows us to identify the utility of con-
sumers.  
 
3. Data collection 
Our data was collected from two sources using Perl scripts that gather information from webpage 
sources by taking advantage of page indexing. 
Property tax data were extracted from the tax administration record search of the Durham county 
government web-site 5. We looped over all unique individual record identifiers (parcel numbers) and col-
lected data on property tax bills for the calendar years 2009 and 2010. As a result, we collected data on 
103445 property tax bills for 2009 and 104068 property tax bills for 2010. Each bill contained infor-
mation on the taxable value of the property, first and last names of the taxpayer and a description of the 
property (including property address). Data on the taxpayer website’s source is stored in tabular format so 
we collected rows that correspond to the years 2009 and 2010, and then merged them into one dataset. 
This procedure took about three weeks. The resulting dataset is what we refer to in Section 2.2 as our 
«public» or auxiliary dataset, ADS . 
                                                
5 See http://www.ustaxdata.com/nc/durham/. 
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Data on restaurants and reviewers were collected from the Yelp website 6. First, we created data 
on the websites of Durham restaurants that are listed in Yelp. Then, we looped over the list of restaurants 
and collected data on restaurant street address, cuisine, price level (3-scale), reviewer’s rating (5-scale), 
phone, zip and I(kid friendly). In addition we collected links to the webpages of reviewers of these restau-
rants. Finally, we went through reviewers’ webpages, and collected data on each reviewer’s first name, 
the initial of her/his surname (this is the only surname data available on Yelp pages), price level of restau-
rants she/he attended, and the average rating she/he gave to restaurants. To collect data on restaurant and 
reviewer characteristics we went through the corresponding webpage source and looked for key words 
that appear right before (or after) the needed information. For example, to collect data on restaurant phone 
numbers, we look for the key word ’bizPhone’. In the webpage source, this keyword appears right before 
phone number, so we extracted the 10 symbols that follow this keywords and got the desired restaurant 
phone number. Following the aforementioned process, we collected data on 485 users and 2326 reviews 
of 290 (out of 343 listed) Durham restaurants. This procedure took around one month. The resulting da-
taset is what we refer to in Section 2.2 as our «private» or main dataset, MDS . 
Tables 1a and 1b present summary statistics of property tax, Yelp rating, cuisine and price data. 
Figures 1 and 2 present histograms of the taxable value of property in the years 2009 and 2010 respective-
ly. Figures 3, 4 and 5 present histograms of restaurant rating, price levels and zip codes respectively. 
 
      Table 1a. Summary statistics from the property tax dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
   Years 2009 and 2010      
Property: Taxable Value 207513 261611.9 1713482 3 2.78E+08 
   Year 2010      
Property: Taxable Value 104068 263216.1 1734340 3 2.78E+08 
 
 
                                                
6 See http://www.yelp.com/durham-nc. 
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           Table 1b. Summary statistics from the Yelp dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
Rating-level data      
Rating 2326 3.651 1.052 1 5 
Price level 2265 1.631 0.573 1 3 
Cuisine: Mexican 2326 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Cuisine: Japanese 2326 0.062 0.242 0 1 
Cuisine: Breakfast 2326 0.113 0.318 0 1 
Cuisine: Asian 2326 0.092 0.290 0 1 
Cuisine: American 2326 0.180 0.384 0 1 
Cuisine: Italian 2326 0.035 0.184 0 1 
Restaurant-level data      
Average rating 290 3.479 0.796 1 5 
Price level 251 1.446 0.558 1 3 
 
 
Fig. 1. Distribution of taxable values of property in the Durham, NC area in 2009 
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Fig. 2. Distribution of taxable values of property in the Durham, NC area in 2010 
 
 
Fig 3. Distribution of Yelp users’ rating scores for restaurants 
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Fig. 4. Distribution of restaurants’ price levels as reported on restaurants’ Yelp pages 
 
 
Fig. 5. Distribution of restaurants’ zip codes 
 
Next, we merged the property tax and Yelp datasets using first name and the initial of the surname as 
identifiers. 304 Yelp users (out of 485) had at least one match with the same first name and same surname 
initial in the property tax data. Sixty-six of these users were uniquely identifiable in both databases. Table 
2 presents the matching statistics. 
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  Table 2. Matching distribution 
# of matches Frequency Percentage # of yelp users 
1 in yelp ®  1 in tax data 66 1.54 66 
1 ®  2 92 2.19 46 
2 ®  1 2 2.19 2 
1 ®  3 72 1.68 24 
1 ®  4 36 0.84 9 
1 ®  5 65 1.51 13 
1 ®  6 114 2.65 19 
1 ®  7 56 1.30 8 
1 ®  8 88 2.05 11 
1 ®  9 81 1.89 9 
1 ®  10 or more 3623 84.35 97 
Total 4295 100 304 
 
4. Empirical analysis based on «one-to-one matches» subsample 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for those reviewers (and their reviews) who have unique 
matches in the property tax dataset, i.e. our «one-to-one match» subsample. In addition to the variables 
described above, we constructed a few more as follows. Based on the data for zip codes, we constructed a 
dummy variable that indicates whether or not the restaurant is in the city centre, as well as a dummy vari-
able for whether or not the reviewer lives within the same zip code as the restaurant. Based on the review-
er’s first name we evaluated the gender of the reviewer and constructed a dummy variable to indicate 
whether or not the reviewer is female (to be precise, has female name). 
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           Table 3. Summary statistics for «one-to-one matches» subsample in combined dataset 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
Rating 429 3.492 1.001 1 5 
Price level 416 1.579 0.584 1 3 
Cuisine: Mexican 429 0.107 0.310 0 1 
Cuisine: Japanese 429 0.049 0.216 0 1 
Cuisine: Breakfast 429 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Cuisine: Asian 429 0.084 0.278 0 1 
Cuisine: American 429 0.177 0.382 0 1 
Cuisine: Italian 429 0.051 0.221 0 1 
I(city center) 429 0.233 0.423 0 1 
I(same zip) 429 0.219 0.414 0 1 
I(female) 429 0.214 0.411 0 1 
log(property value) 429 12.26 0.634 10.34 13.14 
 
As we have already mentioned, estimation of utility parameters based only on «one-to-one 
match» data will likely suffer from «activity bias» due to oversampling of a selected group of individuals 
that submit reviews on Yelp (which corresponds to a familiar selection bias). 
Table 4 provides evidence of this selection in our data. Columns 1 and 2 provide estimates for 
probit regressions of the probability of giving a review for a certain restaurant for reviewers from the 
«one-to-one match» subsample without and with restaurant fixed effects. The results show that selection 
does take place on reviewer characteristics: people with more expensive properties (acting as a proxi for 
higher incomes) give more reviews, people give more reviews to restaurants within the same zip code 
area, and females gives fewer reviews. And again, some of these characteristics are not observable in the 
Yelp database, e.g. personal income and zip code of the area in which the reviewer lives. 
 
21 
 
Table 4. Probit regression estimates for probability of giving review,  
sample restricted to «one-to-one matches» 
 Probability of giving a review 
log(property value) 0.129 0.144 
 [0.038]*** [0.039]*** 
I(same zip) 0.252 0.289 
 [0.059]*** [0.062]*** 
I(female) –0.503 –0.539 
 [0.051]*** [0.053]*** 
Price level 0.095  
 [0.040]**  
I(city center) 0.103  
 [0.057]*  
Cuisine: Mexican 0.077  
 [0.078]  
Cuisine: Japanese 0.271  
 [0.115]**  
Cuisine: Breakfast 0.207  
 [0.083]**  
Cuisine: Asian 0.077  
 [0.084]  
Cuisine: American 0.092  
 [0.065]  
Cuisine: Italian 0.07  
 [0.104]  
Restaurant FE No Yes 
Constant –3.474 –4.255 
 [0.46]*** [1.03]*** 
Observations 11635 11635 
Note. Robust standard errors in brackets. 
*, **, *** — significant at 10, 5 and 1%. 
 
Table 5 presents estimates of the utility parameters of the model presented above. As one can see, 
correction for «activity bias» mentioned above changes most of the estimated utility parameters. 
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            Table 5. Estimates of utility parameters 
 Model with truncation  
( =1U ) 
Model without truncation  
( = 0U ) 
Cuisine: Mexican 0.254 0.541 
 0.108 0.228 
Cuisine: Japanese 0.546 1.064 
 0.211 0.357 
Cuisine: Breakfast 0.088 0.210 
 0.114 0.223 
Cuisine: Asian 0.063 0.249 
 0.112 0.234 
Cuisine: American 0.024 0.145 
 0.077 0.178 
Cuisine: Italian –0.153 –0.482 
 0.141 0.302 
I(city center) 0.051 0.067 
 0.074 0.163 
Price –0.060 –0.241 
 0.064 0.114 
log(property value) 0.019 0.029 
 0.009 0.017 
I(same zip) –0.022 –0.155 
 0.036 0.159 
I(female) 0.095 0.167 
 0.067 0.156 
Constant 0 (fixed) 0 (fixed) 
U  1(fixed) 0 (fixed) 
sˆ  0.050 0.0001 
 0.005 0.002 
Note.  Bootstrapped standard errors are italicized 
 
5. Estimation under 2- and 3-anonymity 
Finally, we check how estimates of our parameters would change if we impose 2-anonymity and 
3-anonymity on individual identifiers in the Yelp dataset. In the case of 2-anonymity, for each of the 66 
Yelp users from the «one-to-one match» subsample, we tried to find at least one alternative match in the 
property tax data. First, we tried to find at least one person with the same first name and same (or nearest 
if the same is not available) zip code with most of the rated restaurants, and different surname initial. 
Thus, we first try to «suppress» the surname initial. Out of these 66 users, 61 had this second match in tax 
data. For the remaining 5 users that do not have at least one other match in first name, we match them 
with people with the same surname initial. Then, for each individual in the Yelp «one-to-one match» sub-
sample, we randomly pick a unique «suppressed match» in the property tax database for the respective 
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individual and estimate the utility parameters for this «possibly mismatched» subsample. Figure 6 shows 
the convex hull of set of possible utility parameters on two-dimensional space of coefficients that arose 
from our particular random selection of the «possibly mismatched» subsamples. A similar process was 
followed for the case of 3-anonymity. Figure 7 shows the superimposed convex hulls of the sets of pa-
rameter estimates from the «one-to-one matches» subsamples, 2- and 3-anonymity imposed «possibly 
mismatched» subsamples. The largest convex hull in each case pertains to the imposition of 3-anonymity 
and the unique estimates of course pertain to the «one-to-one matches» subsample. As can be seen, more 
stringent anonymity restrictions result in larger sets of parameter estimates — thus leading to larger con-
vex hulls. This illustrates the trade-off between the anonymity of data used in estimation and identifica-
tion of parameters in our estimation problem. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Convex hulls of set of estimates of utility parameters in the case of 2-anonymity 
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Fig. 7. Superimposed convex hulls of sets of estimates of utility parameters  
from the «one-to-one matches», and imposing 2-anonymity and 3-anonymity 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper highlights the consequences for estimation using data from combined datasets that re-
sult from imposing stricter restrictions on data security. Given a restriction on anonymity from the data 
curator, this restriction can be satisfied by implementing k-anonymity for a «correct» choice of kÎN . 
With stricter restrictions on anonymity however, larger k ’s must be chosen. Our empirical example 
shows that as ijM  increases, the resulting set of parameter estimates get larger as the set of possible mis-
matched combined datasets get larger. Hence, a trade-off exists between the econometrician’s goal of 
providing accurate estimates for the parameters of interest and the data curator’s goal of preserving sensi-
tive individual data from disclosure. 
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